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Abstract
Devastating forest fires during the summer of 2007 resulted in an unprecedented level of
destruction in the Mediterranean forests, prompting widespread speculation about profitmotivated arson as one of the principal causes of the fires. Forest protection laws
essentially create a scarcity of land, making arson potentially profitable in several ways:
the clearing of land for development and construction, expansion of farm size, and
salvage logging (Economist 2007). This study seeks to evaluate the validity of these
accusations by examining the relationship between land, wheat, and timber prices and
incidence of forest fires in four countries: Spain, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. The fixed
effects estimation yields mixed results, confirming the existence of a link between profit
motives and forest fires, but failing to corroborate the arson allegations.
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I. Introduction
The summer of 2007 was full of unpleasant surprises for Europe. While Britons
saw their possessions float away in the immense floods that engulfed them after days of
unabated torrential rains, Europeans along the Mediterranean directed countless prayers
for rain toward the heavens as they fought some of the worst forest fires they had ever
faced. As early as the end of July, the area of Europe’s woodland lost to fires – 337,600
hectares – had already matched the losses of all of 2006 – 358,500 hectares. Just one
month later, the total damage had already surpassed that of the previous year, over 80
people had perished in the flames, and damages in Greece alone were estimated at 3bn
Euros, or about 0.7% of the country’s GDP (Davidson 2007). Clearly, forest fires are a
phenomenon of great impact.
In fact, southern Europeans have always feared droughts, not only for their
adverse effects on agriculture and water supply, but also for being a harbinger of
destructive forest fires. In a region where roughly a third of the total land area is covered
by forest, more than 50,000 fires burn an estimated 600,000 - 800,000 hectares annually.
This figure represents about 1,5% of total Mediterranean woodlands. The average total
burnt area in the EU Mediterranean countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, and Spain
– has quadrupled since the 60’s, largely as a result of land-use changes, socio-economic
conflicts, and competing interests (WWF 2003). The gravity of these statistics and the
tragic events of the summer of 2007 merit attention from researchers, policymakers, and
the general public. (Consult Figure 1 for an illustration of the number of fires per
Mediterranean country over the last 10 years, paying particular attention to the spike in
Greece’s data for 2007.)
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The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that over 95% of forest
fires in the Mediterranean are human induced (WWF 2003). While this may initially
seem implausible, the fact that about three-fourths of Europe’s forests have been
influenced by humans, combined with the absence of certain climatic phenomena such as
dry storms in the Mediterranean region, lends credibility to the claim. In addition, a large
fraction of the total number of forest fires remains unexplained, allowing further
investigation into the causes of woodland fires, which is precisely the intent of this study
(Alexandrian et al. 1999).
The forest fires of 2007 prompted an avalanche of accusations in the media, as
well as on the part of politicians and environmental groups; accusations that were largely
made possible by the aforementioned ambiguity regarding the causes European forest
fires. The claim was that most of the fires had been set off by arsonists seeking profit
through various channels. An article titled, “A combustible mixture: Forest fires in
Europe”, is only one among many to point toward human activity as a cause of forest
fires. Undoubtedly, fires started by farmers to burn stubble or clear land can
unintentionally get out of control, but economically motivated arson, claims the article,
poses a much more serious challenge to forest protection (The Economist, August 30,
2007).
The underlying issue is one of scarcity: since land is a scarce resource, there are
alternative uses for forested land than merely allowing it to remain in its natural state.
Each of these alternative uses is potentially more profitable, with three particular
scenarios highlighted. One possibility, driven by rising incomes and the implied rise in
the demand for property, is using the land for construction and development (e.g.
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building vacation condos or accommodating urban sprawl). Rising property prices are
likely to increase the profitability of such endeavors. The second alternative is planting
crops on previously forested land, which results in increased revenue for farmers. In
general, rising crop prices would likely encourage farmers to produce more (and with the
world price of grain rising steadily over the last few years, there is no lack of incentive).
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy might exacerbate the situation by encouraging
larger farm size. Finally, harvesting the trees and selling them in the lumber market is
another opportunity to earn income from the land, an opportunity whose appeal rises in
tandem with rising timber prices.1
However, forest protection laws forbid all three of the abovementioned economic
pursuits. Regardless of different trends in forest ownership (most forests in Greece and
Bulgaria are public, while Spain and Italy have predominantly privately-owned woods),
legislation prohibits any cultivation, construction, or logging on all forested areas.2 Thus,
the interested parties are likely to resort to arson as a way to circumvent forest protection
laws. The perpetrators are not impeded by laws that forbid construction for a certain
number of years on former forested areas, since weak law enforcement and corruption
generally allows them to reclassify burned land as former farmland, which can then be
used essentially for anything.3 This is especially the case in Greece, which lacks a

1

A fourth incentive emerges from the literature review in the form of compensation to volunteer
firefighters: the unemployed are motivated to start fires knowing that they will get paid to put them out.
However, this explanation has several drawbacks. It does not fit well within the framework of land scarcity
and alternative uses of land, it proved impossible to confirm whether similar compensation is provided
outside of Italy or how much the compensation actually is, and the media failed to mention this possibility
in its criticism. Thus, while unemployment is tested in the model, its importance is inferior to that of the
price variables, which are the principal focus of this study.
2
Although very limited logging may be carried out in private forests with special permission from forest
managing organs.
3
In the case of logging, it may seem illogical to wish to set fire to potential lumber. However, of primary
interest here is a practice referred to as “salvage logging.” This is a scenario in which burned trees are
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comprehensive registry of forested land. In contrast, a Greenpeace study conducted in
Spain concluded that arsonists were only a minority (The Economist, August 30, 2007).
These conditions imply that, assuming an ability to control for all other factors that may
affect forest fires, it would be possible to isolate the arson effect, which would be
observed in significantly different coefficients for each of the two countries.
The hypothesized economic incentives for forest arson are an application of Gary
Becker’s rational choice model of criminal behavior as the theoretical framework of this
study (Becker 1968). Becker’s model considers the criminal as a profit-maximizing
individual who will only commit a crime (set off a fire) if the expected marginal utility is
greater than zero. The study makes use of annual data for the time period 1991-2005 from
a wide variety of sources including EuroStat, FAOStat, the ILO, and national banks.
Thus, based on a sound theoretical model and eclectic data sources, and seeking to shed
some light on a relatively unexplored topic, this paper seeks to determine whether it is
possible to observe a positive relationship between the prices of land, timber, and
agricultural products and the incidence of forest fires in a panel of southern European
countries. The number of forest fires is regressed on the price variables while controlling
for weather, law enforcement, macroeconomic conditions, tourism, and country fixed
effects. The findings of this study are likely to have implications regarding the potential
for certain types of legislation to create perverse incentives and how these can be
corrected.
II. Literature Review

harvested for lumber since only their bark has been affected by the fire, while the heart of the tree remains
intact (Black 2007). For instance, Alexandrian et al (1999) attest to the existence of an economy based on
the cutting and the marketing of burnt woods. Thus, by setting off a fire, loggers would have more trees to
harvest, which translates into higher income.
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In order to clarify the issue at stake, identify the relevant variables, and assess the
possible implications of any results, a large variety of sources must be consulted. While
articles from popular news sources (cited in the Introduction) serve as a starting point by
introducing the idea of forest arson and the legal elements involved, scholarly literature
on the topics of arson, forest fires, and the Mediterranean region is crucial. First, it is
necessary to ascertain that a connection does, indeed, exist between arson and economic
factors. Perhaps the keystone study on this topic is by Hershbarger and Miller (1978),
who examine the impact of economic conditions on the incidence of arson. In testing the
null hypothesis that no statistically significant relationship exists between the movement
of selected economic variables and fire losses, they find a statistically significant
relationship between arson losses and several of the economic indicators. The
relationship is particularly strong (and positive) between arson and bankruptcy filings, as
well as the federal budget surplus. While this study has provoked various critiques, such
as Spillman and Zak’s (1979) claim that the relationship between the business cycle and
incendiary activity is very weak, Murrey et al. (1992), in an updated economic arson
model, confirms Hershbarger and Miller’s findings. Among the independent variables
tested, forgery bond loss ratios, the yield on long-term treasury bonds, and Canada’s
consumer price index are only a few of those that demonstrate a significant relationship
with arson losses.
Once a generic link between economics and arson has been confirmed, a closer
look is taken at the specific phenomenon of forest fires. Various studies have sought to
model the occurrence of woodland fires. Prestemon and Butry (2005) set up wildland
arson as an autoregressive crime function. The authors succeed in modeling the
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phenomenon in a way that accounts for temporal clustering, thus introducing annual
variation in wildland arson, which may explain more accurately how arson is affected by
variables that change slowly or that cannot be expressed precisely at the daily time scale.
Keane et al. (2003) also try to model arson, but they do so through simulation,
determining the relative importance of simulation time span, fire frequency parameters,
and fire size parameters. In a curious small-scale project, Mees (1991) focuses on the
phenomenon of arson weather, or the idea that as weather conditions raise the possibility
of a forest fire, arsonists’ propensity to start them also rises. His findings may have
implications for the results of this study, in that if arson is a fairly small-scale
phenomenon, weather variables may pick up its contribution to forest fires, thus masking
any existing significance. None of these studies, however, considers economic incentives
for arson.
Instead, a number of single-country case studies seeking to determine the causes
of forest fires provide guidance regarding the profit incentive and the inclusion of certain
variables in the supply model. Perhaps the case study most closely linked to the purpose
of this paper is carried out by Arima et al. (2007) in the Brazilian Amazon. The authors
use the prices of beef and soy as a predictor of forest fires, finding a significant positive
relationship between the commodity prices and the incidence of fire. The results of their
investigation indicate that commodity prices can, indeed, be an incentive for fire arson,
thus justifying the inclusion of the price of wheat as an independent variable in the
model.4 Pazienza and Beraldo (2004) examine the effects of forestry legislation on the
frequency of fires in Southern Italy. Compensation schemes for volunteer firefighters and
4

Surprisingly, temperature was not included as a control variable in the model, indicating that it does not
significantly affect the incidence of Amazon fires. This has implications for the model of European forest
arson, as will be illustrated further.
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the mechanism for distribution of federal funds to local governments based on incidence
of forest fires encourage the unemployed or local officials to undertake incendiary
activities. The study’s findings of a significant, positive relationship between fires and
unemployment demonstrate how legislation can provide perverse incentives for the
setting off of forest fires and serve as the basis for the inclusion of unemployment in this
model. Other studies yield a variety of results, from pointing to the burning of debris and
incendiary activities as the primary causes of wildfires in Brazil (Soares et al. 2006), to
indicating weather conditions as the main culprit in Poland (Ubysz et al. 2006), to
promoting a theory of economically-motivated arson in a Mexican context (Aridjis 1998).
In considering specifically the Mediterranean region, Alexandrian et al. (1999)
focus on the causes of forest fires, highlighting that these are predominantly humaninduced rather than of natural origin. They argue that rising standards of living in the
region are contributing to the growing incidence of woodland fires by spurring a transfer
of population from rural to urban areas. This demographic change has resulted in a loss of
inhabitants with a sense of responsibility for the forest and, more importantly, an increase
in the amount of fuel,5 both of which imply a rise in the number and intensity of forest
fires. The growth of per capita GDP is included in this investigation (with an expected
positive sign) to reflect Alexandrian et al.’s claims. Velez (1990) further develops the
theory of tourist presence in Mediterranean forests as a significant contributing factor to
fires. He blames the carelessness of smokers and excursionists who light cooking fires, as
well as a secondary effect of their presence: the burning of large quantities of solid waste

5

The accumulation of fuel refers to the gradual build up of biomass on the forest floor due to stagnation in
forest activity. The presence of such highly flammable material raises the probability of a fire.
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left by tourists and other recreational users of forest areas. Thus, it appears to be
necessary to control for camper presence in the model.
Other studies related to the general topic of forest fires fall within the field of
forensic economics, analyzing the costs, be they social or economic, of the burning of
hundreds of hectares of forest. Ortuno-Perez and Martin-Fernandez (2004) explore the
cost of forest fire in southern Spain, while Rella et al. (2005) investigate the economic
impact of forest fires in Italy. Both investigations conclude that the costs of forest fires
are enormous and show concern for the negative impact they have on frail domestic
economies, which attests to the relevance of the current study. From the concern
regarding costs stems the idea that fires must be prevented, but there exists a problem of
who will bear the costs of prevention measures. Seemingly, they ought to be borne by the
communities at risk – an idea that has spawned the trend of contingent valuation, or a sort
of payment-in-kind measurement. This method has been applied to gauge communities’
willingness to pay for forest fire prevention. For example, Hung et al. (2007) apply this in
a Vietnamese context and conclude that CVM is a much more effective manner of
persuading villagers to pay for fire prevention efforts. Their work may delineate a
potential route for future government action.
All of the research outlined above, when grouped together, succeeds in portraying
forest arson as an economic phenomenon. This study is unique in focusing precisely on
the relation between prices of land, crops, and timber and the incidence of forest fires,
something that has not been done before and that, if successfully modeled, may
demonstrate a need for policy changes in forest fire prevention.
III. Theoretical Model
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The nature of arson as a voluntary, illegal activity calls for a rational choice
model of criminal behavior. The first of two theoretical models that were considered in
relation to this topic was developed by Ehrlich (1973) and assumes that the gains from
illegal activity depend solely on the amount of time devoted to that activity. It seems
hardly applicable in the case of forest arson, which is neither a time-intensive activity,
nor one that can replace legal activity as a source of income in the long term.
Furthermore, the gains from forest arson do not depend directly on the amount of time
dedicated to it, but rather on changes in the relative profitability of alternative land use
and the probability of getting away with the crime. Arson, then, violates the basic
assumptions of Ehrlich’s model.
Hence, the preferred model is one developed by Gary Becker (1968) in which the
arsonist is modeled as a utility-maximizing individual presented with the choice of
whether or not to commit a crime. Economists generally agree that, when other variables
are held constant, an increase in a person’s probability of conviction or punishment
would generally decrease his likelihood of committing the crime. Conversely, an increase
in the utility of the illegal act would make it more appealing to the individual and hence
raise the probability of its execution. However, neither the gain, nor the punishment is
certain (the arsonist may or may not get caught), which calls for a model that focuses on
expected utility. Becker illustrates this algebraically as
,
where

is the individual’s income, monetary plus psychic, from an offense;

utility function;

is the monetary equivalent of the punishment; and

of conviction. By taking the partial derivatives with respect to
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or

is his

is the probability
it can be seen that

an increase in either the probability of conviction or the cost of the penalty would
decrease the marginal utility expected from committing the offence

and

.
In contrast, an increase in the income from engaging in the illegal activity ( ) would
increase the expected marginal utility of the crime.
Logically, an individual will only break the law if the expected marginal utility of
doing so is greater than zero. Thus, the expected marginal utility of a crime determines
the number of offences, allowing Becker to expresses the crime supply function (with
as the number of offences an individual would commit) as
,
where

and

retain their meaning from above, and

is a variable representing all the

other factors (income available in other activities, nuisance arrests, etc.) that are likely to
influence the marginal utility of committing a crime. A change in any one of these is
expected to result in a change in the number of offences carried out. For instance, an
increase in the probability of conviction reduces the utility expected from the crime and
thus reduces the number of crimes supplied

.
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In applying Becker’s theory to arson, the probability of conviction and its cost are
grouped into a single variable – law enforcement – due to unavailability of data. The
simplified model is expressed as
,
so that the expected utility of setting off a fire depends on the extent to which law
enforcement, fpj, is likely to reduce the income, Yj, from the crime.6 Income itself consists
of several components: the price of timber (PT), the price of land (PL), the price of wheat
(PW), and unemployment (UE).7 Taking the partial derivatives of the altered equation,
first with respect to income, then with respect to law enforcement, illustrates that an
increase in income (essentially, an increase in the profit incentive) raises the expected
marginal utility of breaking the law

,
whereas an increase in fpj lowers it

.
As in the generic crime scenario, an individual will only start a fire if the expected
marginal utility of doing so relative to a change in any one of the income components is
greater than zero. To illustrate,

6

The law enforcement variable (an index of corruption in the actual model) cannot be subtracted directly
from the income that could be generated by a fire. Rather, the equation is only meant to illustrate the idea
that better law enforcement and stricter punishment detracts from the potential profits.
7
It is difficult to determine whether unemployment should be included in the income variable (Y) or
grouped with the factors in u. While a greater number of unemployed implies more fires, being
unemployed is not in and of itself a financial incentive to set off a fire. Rather, the incentive would be the
actual compensation one would receive as a volunteer firefighter. Essentially, then, UE is included as a
factor of income only in the theoretical sense; in terms of the actual modeling, this ‘classification’ is
unimportant.
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,
for a change in the price of timber, but PT could just as easily be replaced by PL, PW,
etc. Thus, a change in the incentive structure or in the potential of getting caught alters
the likelihood that the law is broken. Essentially, the expected marginal utility of arson
determines the number of fires supplied intentionally, allowing the total supply of forest
fires (FF) to be modeled as
FFj = f(Yj, fpj, uj),
where uj stands for any factors that contribute to natural or accidental forest fires. Each of
the variables in this model is then decomposed into its respective parts, so that the
comprehensive supply model, derived largely from the media’s allegations and the
literature review, becomes
FF=f(PL, PT, PW, UE, LE, Precip, Temp, GDPgr, Tourism).
The first four variables have already been described as the profit incentive to forest arson;
LE stands for law enforcement, or the potential cost to the perpetrator; and the remaining
pieces are all factors that must be controlled for. Precipitation and temperature seek to
offset weather effects, GDP growth ought to control for demographic and social changes,
as well as the accumulation of fuel in the woods, and accounting for tourism siphons out
the fires started by negligent people in close proximity to forested areas. 8 This selection
of variables, while perhaps not exhaustive, realistically allows us to measure the effect of
the proposed incentives for arson while controlling for alternative causes of forest fires

8

It has been suggested that the supply of forest fires might be represented by a kinked supply curve of
sorts. Basically, in natural or accidental conditions, the supply of fires is vertical, but as the potential
returns to arson rise, the supply begins to slope upward.

13

such as weather conditions and unintended human intervention. The following section
addresses the variables in greater detail.
IV. Model Variables and Data Sources9
The intended dataset for this study included six southern European countries –
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Bulgaria, France, and Greece – over a 15-year time period, 19912005. These countries were originally selected because of their high incidence of forest
fires,10 the similarity of their climates, and coordination of their forest protection
regulation under the European Union’s Sixth Environment Action Program.
Unfortunately, unavailability of data forced the exclusion of Portugal and France from
the dataset and also limited the years with a complete set of observations to
approximately 1995-2005. A table of summary statistics for this final dataset, categorized
by country, is available in the Appendix (Table1).
The dependent variable, forest fires, could have taken on one of several distinct
forms: number of forest fires started, total acres burned, or percentage of forest burned
(over a one year period). The first of those is the best one for the model, since, to the
extent that fires are a function of arson, their number depends directly on the individual’s
decision to start a fire, whereas he/she would have no control over the area burned. The
number of fires is divided by the area of forested land in the country (measured in
thousands of acres) and then scaled up by one hundred. Essentially, the final form of the
depended variable is number of fires per one hundred thousand hectares of forested area,
with country means that range from as low as 14 for Bulgaria to almost ten times more
9

Italics mark the use of exact variable names (e.g. UE rather than unemployment rate).
A report on Wildfire 2007, the 4th International Wildfire Conference, explains that Spain, Portugal, Italy,
France and Greece are worst affected due to their geographical position and climate conditions. They are
the EU member states with the highest forest fire risk index, and where the largest amount of burnt
forestland is recorded (Rego, May. 10, 2007).
10
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for Spain. This variable exhibits a great deal of variation both over time and across
countries. The source is the Timber Bulletin, an annual publication of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
The UNECE is also the source of data on one of the profit incentive variables:
timber prices (Price Timber). These are calculated as a weighted average of the export
prices per cubic meter of roundwood, plywood, and sawnwood – the three principal wood
products of the panel countries – and then transformed from real dollar prices, to real
Euro prices (UNECE).11 Much like the dependent variable, the price of timber exhibits a
great deal of variation, with Italy having average prices approximately ten times greater
than Bulgaria. Variations in the price of land (Chng Price Land) are captured in a
variable that measures annual change in the real price of a square meter of residential
property which is compiled from several different publications. Data on Greece is from
an OECD report on real estate price indexes (Eiglsperger 2006); statistics on Spain are
from the Bank of Spain (Bank of Spain), Italian prices are published by Nomisma, an
economic research institute (Nomisma); and the value of Bulgaria’s property is made
available by the National Statistical Institute (NSI).12 The mean change in housing prices
for Bulgaria stands out with its large magnitude and negative sign. This is largely the
effect of hyperinflation and economic problems during the transition period. Next,
producer wheat prices (Price Wheat) from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization
are used as a proxy for farmers’ profit incentive (FAOSTAT). Wheat was chosen because
11

Since the Euro was only introduced in 1999, the Federal Reserve’s “Euro Community” exchange rate is
used for data prior to that year. It forms a continuous series with the ensuing Euro exchange rate. In
addition, although Bulgaria has a distinct national currency, it is pegged to the Euro (and previously the
German mark), which makes the use of Euro prices suitable (FRED).
12
An alternative variable, the European Central Bank’s Residential Property Price Index for the Euro Area,
was tried in the model, but it performed poorly, most likely due to its failure to capture fluctuations within
each country.
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it is a principal crop grown in each of the countries in the model and enjoys steady
demand.13 It was lagged in order to account for the seasonal nature of agriculture:
arguably, a farmer cannot expand the area under cultivation until the next planting
season.14 Lags of the other two price variables were also tried, but they proved to have
less explanatory power than non-lagged values, which indicates that loggers and
contractors are able to react to price changes quickly. Figure 3 graphs the prices of timber
and wheat alongside the average number of forest fires in an effort to illustrate the
fluctuations in all of them over time. The final variable related to economically motivated
arson – unemployment (UE) – is reported as total, civilian unemployment rates from the
International Labor Organization (ILO). The coefficients on all four of the variables just
described are expected to have positive signs based on the profit-motivated arson theory.
The law enforcement variable is represented by Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is reported on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1
indicating the lowest level of corruption and 10, the highest (Transparency
International).15 The expected sign on the corruption index is positive, since higher levels
of corruption arguably lower the costs of arson, raising the supply of fires. Several
alternatives to the CPI were considered, such as number of crimes committed per capita
and two of the World Bank’s aggregate governance indicators – control of corruption and
government effectiveness – but none improved the explanatory capacity of the model.
13

According to FAOSTAT, a producer price is “the amount receivable by the producer from the purchaser
for a unit of a good or service produced as output minus any VAT, or similar deductible tax, invoiced to the
purchaser” (FAOSTAT). Seemingly, this measure does not account for any subsidies.
14
Lags were also tried with the other two price variables, but
15
Normally, the scale goes the other way around: 1 is most corrupt, 10 is least corrupt. However, the
measurement was “flipped” in order to make for easier interpretation of the coefficient. TI defines the CPI
thus: “The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of the degree
to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, a
poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety
of independent and reputable institutions” (TI).
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Although it is easy to note that Bulgaria, for instance, is more corrupt than Spain, CPI
exhibits very little within-country variation (standard deviations ranging between .4 and
1), which might deprive it of significant descriptive power.
Turning to the accidental and natural factors, weather in the model is accounted
for in two ways: a measure of precipitation (Precip), which is predicted negative, and a
measure of temperature (Days80up), predicted positive. National meteorological
institutes provide monthly precipitation data, with the precipitation variable an average of
rainfall (in millimeters) over the three summer months – June, July, and August – in the
most affected regions.16 Bulgaria is the country that receives the greatest amount of
rainfall (50mm per month), which partially explains its significantly lower number of
forest fires. The University of Dayton is the source of daily temperature data for each of
the four countries, data which is converted into a variable indicating the number of days
during which the country experienced temperatures above 80 degrees Fahrenheit over the
four hottest months, June through September (U of Dayton). The temperature variable
fares better in this particular format than as average temperature or maximum
temperature, although Greece appears to have an unusually high number of hot days.17
Real GDP per capita growth (GDPgr), made available by the USDA’s Economic
Research Service, is expected to be positive for reasons laid out in the literature review,
as well as on the assumption that economic growth is an indication of more development
and construction, which raises the demand for land (USDA). Finally, tourism (Campers)
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For Spain, precipitation data was from Barcelona, Salamanca, Madrid, and Seville; for Italy, the
Ciampino weather station, located in the middle of the peninsula; for Greece, Kalamata, Mikra, and
Alexadroupoli; and for Bulgaria, Haskovo, Pleven, Pazardzhik, and Kazanlyk. These locations are marked
with red dots on the map of forest fire risk in the Appendix.
17
An interaction variable between precipitation and temperature was also tried, since weather that is both
hot and dry would likely result in more fires, but it was found to be insignificant.
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data comes from EUROSTAT – the European Union’s statistics database – and is
calculated as the number of nights (in hundreds) spent by campers divided by the number
of campsites (EUROSTAT). Essentially, it represents a density of campers in the woods
and as such, the anticipated sign of its coefficient is positive, as greater human presence
increases the chances of fires caused by negligence.
V. Econometric Estimation
When using panel data, the general expectation is that because of country-specific
factors, the averages of the dependent variable (number of forest fires) are different for
each cross-section unit (country) but the variance of the errors is not. Indeed, as can be
seen from the summary statistics (Table1), there is significant variation in the mean
number of fires. Spain, for instance, has roughly 140 forest fires annually per one
hundred thousand hectares of forested land, in contrast to Bulgaria, which can expect less
than 15. In contrast, the difference in the standard deviations is not nearly as pronounced
(27 versus 12). Such peculiarities in the data tend to result in inconsistent coefficients on
the independent variables with random effects estimation. The technique most commonly
used to eliminate the inconsistency is fixed effects estimation. By creating country
binaries and including them in an ordinary least squares model, country-specific
characteristics are controlled for, leaving only time-dependent variation in the data. In
order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, the country binary for Spain is left out of the
estimation models. Thus, the coefficients on the other countries indicate how the number
of forest fires in Italy, Greece, or Bulgaria compares to the number of fires in Spain.18

18

At early stages of modeling, year binaries were also tried in an effort to control for year-specific
idiosyncrasies, but they were found to be insignificant.
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Expectations regarding the coefficient signs on these binaries are uncertain for
several reasons. First of all, if the Greenpeace study carried out in Spain is correct in its
conclusion that arson is not a significant cause of forest fires in the country then Spain
should, arguably, have fewer fires than its Mediterranean neighbors if the model
successfully controls for all other factors (positive signs on all three country binaries).
Second, Greece’s lack of forest records presumably makes arson much easier to carry out
and get away with, resulting in a greater incidence of fires in Greece (positive coefficient
on country binary), other things held constant. Finally, Spain traditionally has suffered
from more forest fires than any of the other countries, so if arson is too small of a
phenomenon, the country binaries are not likely to reflect its impact unless all other
causes are perfectly controlled for. Given this ambiguity, the significance of the binary
variables is evaluated with a two-tailed test, while one-tailed tests are used for all other
variables.
The regression analysis begins with a very simple model, which includes only
unemployment, GDP growth, precipitation, temperature, and campers. The profit
incentive is added in the second model in the form of the three price variables. The
Corruption Perceptions Index – the law enforcement factor – is included in the third
regression. Adding the profit incentives and the potential cost of arson to the model at
separate stages provides a better illustration of the impact of each than would be
obtaining by testing an all-inclusive model from the very beginning. However, that
benefit aside, the results of these three initial models are hardly relevant, since it is
absolutely crucial that fixed effects be included. The fourth model does, indeed, contain
the country binaries, and is the most comprehensive estimation possible. Finally, the
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“best” model is chosen based on a combination of adjusted R-squared optimization, the
strength of the theoretical justification for the inclusion of a variable, and the significance
and sign of the coefficient. Standardized coefficients are calculated to demonstrate the
relative importance of each independent variable in, while variance inflation factors are
monitored to ensure that multicollinearity is not a problem.
VI. Results and Interpretation
Table 2 displays the results of the five regressions, and it can be seen immediately
that the first two models are very similar in their results. The variables account for
approximately four-fifths of the variation in number of forest fires (the second model has
a higher adjusted R-squared than the first model, indicating that including the profit
incentive in the model improves it). Such high explanatory power initially seems
spurious, but it is easily explained by the presence of a precipitation variable, which is the
largest natural determinant of fires, as well the inclusion of a tourism statistic. This latter
measure is highly correlated with the country binaries, meaning that because of their
absence from the model, Campers picks up much of the country-specific significance.
Indeed, the standardized coefficient (0.890 in the initial model, 0.817 in the second) on
the variable is far too high to account only for negligent tourists’ contribution to forest
fires. Aside from the tourism variable, the coefficients on GDP growth, unemployment,
and weather have the expected sign and are significant at least at a 5% confidence level in
the initial model and at least at 10% in the second one. However, only one of the price
variables, the lagged price of wheat, is significant (at 5%) and of the correct sign. A
negative sign on the price of timber contradicts expectations, but its lack of significance
makes this less disconcerting.

20

In the next step, the law enforcement variable, CPI, is added to the model. This is
a variable with very little within-country variation (Table1 indicates that standard
deviations range between .4 and 1 depending on the country). As such, it is highly
correlated with several of the country binaries (thus picking up their effect) and with the
tourism variable (itself highly dependent on country), which explains the appearance of
multicollinearity in the model. CPI itself has a variance inflation factor slightly above 5
(the usual cut-off point for economists), while a VIF surpassing 10 on the camper statistic
indicates that multicollinearity is, indeed, a problem. GDP growth is stripped of its
significance, as are temperature and the price of wheat, while the price of timber becomes
borderline significant (10%) and positive. The unemployment rate and tourism remain as
the strongest predictors of forest fires. Contrary to all expectations, the coefficient on the
law enforcement variable has a negative significant sign, which indicates that as
corruption increases, there are fewer fires. However, attempting to interpret this variable
without controlling for country-specific effects reveals very little information.
When the model is finally run with fixed effects, the R-squared indicates that over
90% of the variation in forest fires is now explained. The adjusted R-squared is also
notably higher than that of the previous model. These measures are viable in spite of the
severe multicollinearity (VIFs around 40 for Campers and Greece, notably above 5 for
another six variables) that has appeared, since multicollinearity does not affect the overall
reliability of the model but rather the accuracy of the individual coefficients.19 As could
be anticipated based on their close association to the country variables, the tourism,
unemployment, and corruption variables all lose their significance. GDP growth regains
19

In case these are of interest, and seeing as they are not included in the results table: UE has a VIF slightly
over 9, Days80up over 7, CPI close to 7, Price Timber around 8, and the remaining country binaries, over
10.
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it, remaining positive, as weather remains almost unchanged. Unfortunately, none of the
price variables is significant, but the multicollinearity in the model might be partially
responsible. All of the country binaries are negative and significant at least at 5%, which
means that Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria all have fewer fires relative to Spain even after
controlling for all of the profit-related, accidental, and natural causes of fires possible.
This will be addressed in greater detail in section VII.
The last column in Table2 displays the results of the final, and preferred, model.
While this model does have a lower R-squared and adjusted R-squared than the previous
one, both measures are still very high, indicating that the model has considerable
explanatory power and is better than the first three models.20 It also uses a greater number
of observations – 49 as compared to 39 in the previous model. All of the variables
removed are ones that were insignificant in the previous model, except for the price
measures, which are retained as the focal point of this study. However, insignificance is
not the only justification for the elimination of UE, Campers, CPI and Days80up.
Perhaps the principal reason for the elimination of the first one was the impossibility of
finding out whether or not the other three countries in the dataset have the same policies
for the compensation of volunteer firefighters as Italy. Thus, if such legislation exists
only in one small area, the unemployment rate is unlikely to have a large impact on the
number of forest fires. Tourism was removed because it was not significant in any one of
numerous fixed effects regressions, it was highly multicollinear with many of the
variables, and its coefficient was of the wrong sign when controlling for fixed effects.
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Naturally, the 5 models included in the results table are only a small representation of the total number of
regressions that have been run on the dataset. The ‘preferred’ model is better than many of them if adjusted
R-squared is considered to be the only criterion. It is better than all of them if adj. R-squared is considered
alongside theoretical justification and the simplicity principle.
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While the theoretical justification for including it into the model might be strong, it
appears that the variable itself fails to capture the desired tourist effect as increased
presence of people in close proximity to forested lands. Corruption was discarded
because not only does the index not offer significant within-country variation over time,
but it might also be failing to capture the exact phenomenon of interest to this study. An
optimal variable would have been percent convicted of forest arson out of total arrests for
it, but such data is not publicly available. Finally, the absence of a temperature variable in
the Pazienza and Beraldo study (2004) of Amazon fires, coupled with the generally
moderate Mediterranean climate and the relatively larger contribution of other weather
phenomena to forest fires are the reasons for the exclusion of the temperature variable.21
Focusing on the results of this final regression, the only insignificant variable is
the change in land prices, which has actually remained insignificant all along. Aside from
the obvious explanation of property prices having no effect on the number of forest fires,
other possibilities include the variable’s ineffectiveness as a proxy for the price of land
that is likely to be a target for arson or the incomplete information given by a “change in
price” variable rather than an actual measure of price. All of the other variables have the
predicted sign and are significant at least at 10%. In comparing standardized coefficients,
country has the largest impact, followed by the prices of wheat and timber, precipitation,
and finally GDP growth. Multicollinearity is reduced significantly by taking out the
abovementioned variables: it now only slightly (VIF of roughly 6.5) affects Italy and
Price Timber, which is understandable since Italy is characterized by an unusually high
price of timber relative to the other countries. In the interest of interpretation, it appears
21

The insignificance of temperature makes sense. If the weather is hot but wet, the chances of fire are
miniscule, but if conditions are extremely dry, a spark will set of a fire regardless of whether temperature is
in the 60s, 70s, or anything over that.
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that a one percent increase in GDP per capita growth results in over two additional fires
annually; two additional millimeter of precipitation decrease the number of fires by one;
a 100 euro increase in the price of timber leads to three additional fires; and a similar
increase in the previous year’s price of wheat would increase the number of fires by
almost 24. In terms of country binaries, other things held constant, Italy has 60 fewer
fires than Spain, Greece – 95, and Bulgaria – 90. Overall, the model appears to be
capturing the variation in number of forest fires quite well, while adhering to the basic
economic principle of parsimony.
VII. Discussion and Implications
Before the results of the study are evaluated, it ought to be noted that a bold
assumption had to be made regarding the dependent variable. It is assumed that all forest
fires are reported with equal accuracy and based on identical criteria as to what
constitutes a forest fire in terms of magnitude and surrounding vegetation. However,
although the data comes from a uniform source, it is reported to the UNECE by the
individual countries. Differences in the accuracy of monitoring systems, in definitions of
a forest fires, or in the presence (or absence) of incentives to report more fires or conceal
a number of them could all affect the consistency of the data.
Assuming the validity of the data, the fixed effects estimation of forest fires in
southern Europe yields mixed results. On the one hand, there is strong evidence that
human induced changes have an effect on the number of forest fires. This is seen in the
positive, significant coefficient on GDP per capita growth, a coefficient which captures
demographic relocation, incentives for development, and the accumulation of fuel. It
also appears that a profit incentive to arson does, indeed, exist and is manifested in the
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positive, significant coefficients on the price of timber and price of wheat variables.
However, in the absence of a law enforcement variable, these prices do not reflect the
true expected returns from a forest fire. In addition, there may be alternative explanations
for their significance which are not controlled for in the model. For instance, in the case
of higher grain prices, farmers might be starting fires to clear land that is simply
abandoned farmland in order to expand the total area they cultivate. If they lose control of
the fire and it spreads to a nearby forest, that forest is, practically, the victim of economic
incentive, but arson has no part in the scenario. Along the same lines, a rise in the price of
timber would likely implicate increased activity in the logging industry, which raises the
probability of accidental fires. On the flip side, if producer prices from the FAO do not
account for subsidies, which are generous in the European Union, the price of wheat
variable is unable to capture the profit motives in their entirety. Furthermore, ‘arson
weather’ behavior (Mees 1991) might be masking the arson effect (which is relatively
small to begin with), since weather variables such as precipitation would pick up most of
the explanatory power.
Another important consideration revolves around the significance of the country
binaries, which include a variety of factors not controlled for in the model. One
possibility is climate and geographical distinctions, such as the frequency of storms (that
generate lightning, thus sparking fires), wind (which can carry sparks to new patches of
forest), or the location of forests (how far removed are they from cities and human
activity). Another potentially important factor is the amount of resources dedicated to
forest protection and educational campaigns, which can directly decrease the number of
fires. Finally, country binaries represent an aggregate of cultural factors that are
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impossible to isolate – mindsets, attitudes, peculiarities. Perhaps a certain culture has a
stronger sense of responsibility for the state of the world’s forests or is less likely to
throw a cigarette stub out the window. In the exclusion of the CPI, corruption is one of
those ‘cultural’ factors. The fact that the coefficients on Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria are
negative, indicating that all three countries have relatively fewer fires than Spain, could
mean one of several things: first of all, the study that claims that most fires in Spain are
not arson is wrong (the other countries are more corrupt, so they should have had a
greater incidence of arson/fires); second, Greece’s lack of forestry records does not make
it significantly easier to profit from arson than in the countries with forest records
(otherwise Greece would have had a positive coefficient); finally (and most likely), the
incidence of arson is too small to capture without a very precise model. Since the country
binaries carry so much other information, it is very likely that the arson phenomenon is
not pronounced enough to alter the overall country effect.
However, since there is some evidence as to the connection between economic
incentives and forest fires, this might have implications for government policy regarding
forest regulation. One approach would be for governments to bolster their law
enforcement efforts for the protection of forested areas by increasing monitoring and the
severity of punishment. An alternative approach would be to adopt positive incentives.
Ehrlich (1996) argues in favor of a similar course of action, arguing that decreasing the
disparity between potential profits from legal and illegal activities can be an effective
deterrent of crime. Thus, a program offering subsidies to property owners for the
maintenance of their forests in a healthy condition may be an effective solution. Indeed,
Mayer and Tikka (2006) investigate similar initiatives in North America and several
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northern European countries and find that an incentive-based approach is effective in
maintaining biodiversity in privately owned forests.22 Whichever approach is chosen,
policymakers must be aware of the potential consequences of their actions, of the
possible adverse incentives certain forms of legislation might be creating.
VIII. Conclusion
It ought to be conceded that this study leaves many questions unanswered. While
human actions clearly affect the number of forest fires, there is little certainty as to the
exact motivation (legal or illegal, accidental or intentional). The interpretation of countryspecific effects is complicated by the comprehensive nature of the country binaries.
Essentially, the study leaves abundant room for further investigation: expanding the data
set to include Portugal, France, and perhaps Turkey, as well as a greater number of years;
fine-tuning some of the independent variables, particularly in terms of prices; collecting
data on expenditure for forest protection; and investigating the impact of EU agricultural
subsidies on forest fires.
However, one thing is undeniable: forest fires deserve the attention of scholars,
policymakers, and the public worldwide. They are a devastating force that annually
annihilates millions of trees, releases tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and
destroys hundreds of thousands of euro of private property in the countries of southern
Europe (as well as around the world). The fixed effects estimation undertaken in this
study indicates that humans are responsible for more damages than can be offset by
natural factors such as precipitation. Thus, it is every government and every individual’s
22

According to another study, another possible course of action is to encourage cooperation between small
forest owners: “Twelve countries reported that the fragmentation of private holdings represents a hindrance
to sustainable forest management. Small-scale owners may find it more difficult to draw profits than larger
entities, and transfer of knowledge and access to infrastructure can be complicated when owners are many.
Local and regional cooperation among owners is thus crucial.”
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responsibility to ensure the adoption of measures to prevent forest fires resulting from
negligence, deter arsonists through better law enforcement and positive incentives, and
improve the efficiency of firefighting techniques. Keeping in mind the importance of the
Mediterranean forests for biodiversity and the rising threat of global warming, it is
imperative that humans cease to exacerbate a phenomenon that is already so destructive
in its natural state and work to diminish its deleterious effects.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Number of Hot Spots* Detected in Mediterranean Countries
(1996-2007)

* A hotspot is a mark on an infrared satellite image indicating a heat source typical of
burning vegetation.
Source: ATSR World Fire Atlas
http://dup.esrin.esa.int/ionia/wfa/index.asp
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Figure 2: Mapping Levels of Forest Fire Hazard
(Based on: forest fire data for the period 1997-2003 and biogeographic factors)

Source: ESPON (European Spatial Observation Network) Data Base, 2005
http://www.gtk.fi/projects/espon/ForestFires_files/image002.jpg
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Figure 3: Time Trends in 4-Country Average Prices and Number of Fires
(1991-2005)
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for Model Variables
(1991-2005)*

Fires
GDPgr
UE
Timber Price
Price Land (∆)
Price Wheat
Campers
Days80up
Precipitation
CPI

Spain

Italy

Greece

Bulgaria

Mean
(Std Dev)
138.26
(27.03)
2.85
(1.93)
16.60
(5.13)
228.06
(81.15)
8.36
(7.44)
157.36
(25.89)
82.03
(28.86)
10.36
(18.73)
15.98
(10.19)
3.69
(1.06)

Mean
(Std Dev)
96.96
(30.27)
1.15
(1.07)
10.23
(1.36)
871.10
(223.09)
1.87
(6.19)
183.14
(32.31)
94.18
(17.73)
5.27
(8.92)
30.27
(23.24)
5.35
(.78)

Mean
(Std Dev)
50.30
(15.18)
2.51
(1.85)
9.97
(1.00)
231.72
(118.57)
9.58
(3.99)
185.64
(41.39)
21.20
(3.86)
62.09
(7.16)
17.07
(8.69)
5.43
(.43)

Mean
(Std Dev)
14.31
(11.96)
1.76
(5.43)
15.36
(3.41)
77.30
(36.35)
-34.04
(137.17)
80.91
(29.23)
26.46
(12.28)
1.90
(2.51)
52.31
(26.25)
6.30
(.42)

*For certain variables, the available data does not span the entire period. Days80up and
CPI are limited to 1995-2005.
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TABLE 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results: With and Without Fixed
Effects Estimationa
Dependent Variable = Number of Fires per 100,000 Hectares of Forest
Variable

Basic
Model

With Prices

With CPI

Fixed
Effects

"Best"
Model

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
n

0.7947
0.7677
44

0.8309
0.7899
42

0.8571
0.8127
39

0.9282
0.8951
39

0.8803
0.8564
49

-84.041**
(-2.69)

-108.068***
(-3.56)

-35.411
(-0.50)

163.581*
(2.06)

93.872***
(5.28)

4.301***
0.221
(2.88)

3.458**
0.188
(2.26)

2.956
0.112
(0.88)

4.847**
0.183
(1.75)

2.355**
0.124
(1.92)

UE (+)

6.097***
0.424
(4.47)

6.297***
0.455
(4.59)

7.489***
0.575
(5.08)

0.217
0.017
(0.10)

Precip (-)

-0.559***
-0.261
(-2.60)

-.485**
-0.237
(-2.41)

-0.421**
-0.214
(-2.20)

-0.250*
-0.127
(-1.63)

Days80up (+)

0.581**
0.295
(2.29)

0.356*
1.33
(0.187)

0.227
0.125
(0.85)

0.050
0.027
(0.19)

Campers (+)

1.193***
0.890
(7.98)

1.071***
0.817
(6.70)

0.626**
0.508
(2.25)

-0.346
-0.281
(-0.86)

Price Timber (+)

-0.009
-0.059
(-0.57)

0.034*
0.230
(1.65)

0.017
0.117
0.77

0.032*
0.217
(1.56)

Chng Price Land (+)

0.038
0.054
(0.67)

0.600
0.124
(1.21)

-0.451
-0.093
-0.95

-0.012
-0.016
(-0.26)

Lag(Price Wheat) (+)

0.240**
0.200
(2.06)

0.179
0.137
(1.26)

0.134
0.102
0.95

0.238**
0.220
(2.32)

-13.086**
-0.304
(-1.89)

-6.084
-0.141
-1.02

b

Intercept

c

GDPGr (+)

d

CPI (+)
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-0.425***
-0.198
(-2.72)

Italy (?)

-48.552**
-0.444
-2.36

-59.750***
-0.523
(-3.72)

Greece (?)

-114.814***
-1.018
-2.92

-95.413***
-0.745
(-11.04)

Bulgaria (?)

-127.420***
-1.044
-4.36

-89.353***
-0.744
(-6.68)

a. The layout of results for each variable is Coefficient, Standardized Coefficient, (t-value).
b. Significance at 1% is reported as ***, 5% as **, and 10% as *.
c. All tests are one-tailed except for country binaries.
d. The sign in parentheses immediately following the variable name is the anticipated sign of the
coefficient.
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